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RIGHT FOR THE WRONG REASONS:  
THE NINTH CIRCUIT EXCLUDES 
MISAPPROPRIATION FROM THE CFAA’S 
AMBIT IN UNITED STATES v. NOSAL 
Abstract: On April 10, 2012, in United States v. Nosal, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) assigns criminal liability only in instances of 
hacking, not of misappropriation. In reaching this conclusion, the court 
engendered a split with two other circuits, which had previously held that 
the CFAA encompasses misappropriation as well as hacking. This Com-
ment argues that, although the Ninth Circuit correctly excluded misap-
propriation from the CFAA’s ambit, the court’s rationale overlooked a 
more compelling policy consideration favoring the narrow interpretation: 
the potential disruption that a broad interpretation of the CFAA could 
cause within trade secret law. 
Introduction 
 Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), a computer 
user who acquires information from a protected computer and, in do-
ing so, “exceeds authorized access” of that computer may be subject to 
criminal penalties.1 But how broadly should the phrase “exceeds au-
thorized access” be construed?2 More specifically, does the meaning of 
“exceeds authorized access” encompass misappropriation (that is, the 
subsequent and unauthorized use of information that a user was au-
thorized to access in the first place)?3 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits 
have held that it does.4 More recently, however, the Ninth Circuit de-
parted from the precedents established by its sister circuits.5 In 2012, in 
United States v. Nosal (Nosal IV ), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected a broader reading of “exceeds author-
                                                                                                                      
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (“Whoever . . . knowingly and with 
intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized 
access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of 
value, . . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.” (emphasis add-
ed)). 
2 See United States v. Nosal (Nosal IV ), 676 F.3d 854, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
3 Id. 
4 See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010). 
5 See Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 862. 
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ized access” that includes misappropriation, voicing concerns that such 
a reading would a make criminal of anyone who updates a fantasy foot-
ball team at work or posts exaggerated information on dating websites.6 
 Part I of this Comment describes the crime allegedly committed by 
the Nosal defendants and recounts the case’s procedural history prior 
to its arrival before the Ninth Circuit.7 Part II examines the rationales 
underlying both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ adoption of a broader 
interpretation of the CFAA and the Ninth Circuit’s adoption of a nar-
row interpretation.8 Finally, Part III evaluates the Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sion and concludes that the court, although correct in adopting its nar-
row interpretation, inappropriately based its holding on a far-fetched 
worry over the widespread criminalization that might flow from the 
broad interpretation.9 In doing so, the court ignored a more compel-
ling policy consideration favoring the narrow interpretation: the poten-
tial for the broad interpretation to erode trade secret law.10 
I. Nosal’s Motion to Dismiss the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Charges Lodged Against Him 
 David Nosal, the principal defendant in United States v. Nosal, held 
a senior position at Korn/Ferry International (“KFI”), a headhunting 
firm, from 1996 until 2004.11 In 2004, Nosal decided to leave KFI and 
launch his own competing firm.12 After his departure, Nosal persuaded 
some of his former colleagues who were still working at KFI to provide 
him with confidential information stored on KFI’s computer system to 
aid in the development of his new firm.13 The information Nosal asked 
his former colleagues to acquire included KFI’s proprietary lists of 
sources, names, and contact information.14 Under the terms of KFI’s 
computer use policy, Nosal’s former colleagues were permitted to ac-
cess this information, but they were not permitted to disclose it to indi-
viduals unaffiliated with KFI.15 
                                                                                                                      
6 See id. at 860. 
7 See infra notes 11–37 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 38–82 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 83–101 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 83–101 and accompanying text. 
11 United States v. Nosal (Nosal I ), No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009). 
12 Id. 
13 Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 856. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
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 In 2008, the government filed an indictment with the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California charging Nosal with twen-
ty separate criminal counts related to his acquisition of proprietary in-
formation from the KFI computer system.16 Among other alleged of-
fenses, the indictment charged Nosal with violating § 1030(a)(4) of the 
CFAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1030.17 That section assigns criminal liability to 
“[w]hoever . . . knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a pro-
tected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, 
and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains 
anything of value.”18 The government claimed that Nosal was liable un-
der § 1030(a)(4) because Nosal’s accomplices had accessed KFI’s pro-
tected computer both “without authorization and by exceeding author-
ized access” and provided information to Nosal, an outside party, in 
violation of KFI’s computer use policy.19 
 Nosal moved to dismiss the CFAA charges, arguing that the CFAA’s 
text forbids only computer hacking, not misappropriation.20 As Nosal 
observed, § 1030(a)(4) criminalizes only two specific acts: first, access-
ing a protected computer “without authorization,” and second, “ex-
ceed[ing] authorized access” of a protected computer.21 Nosal main-
tained that both prongs of criminal activity proscribed by § 1030(a)(4) 
target hackers, who by definition access computer systems without “au-
thorization.”22 By contrast, neither prong targets users like his cocon-
                                                                                                                      
16 Nosal I, 2009 WL 981336, at *1–2. The indictment also charged two of Nosal’s for-
mer colleagues who participated in his scheme. Id. The district court subsequently granted 
one codefendant’s motion to sever her case from that of Nosal. Id. 
17 Id. at *2; see 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). The indictment also 
charged Nosal with trade secret misappropriation and mail fraud. Nosal I, 2009 WL 
981336, at *2. 
18 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). The CFAA separately defines the term “protected comput-
er” at § 1030(e)(2), but that definition is widely considered to comprise broadly any com-
puter connected to the Internet and is therefore ordinarily accorded little consequence. 
See id. § 1030(e)(2); Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 859 (noting that the term “‘protected computer’ 
. . . effectively [includes] all computers with Internet access”); Patrick Patterson Custom 
Homes, Inc. v. Bach, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1032–33 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (holding that “a com-
puter that provides access to worldwide communications through applications accessible 
through the internet qualifies as a protected computer”); Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cy-
berproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2164, 2167 (2004) (observing that the term “protected” com-
puter “likely encompasses any computer linked to the Internet”). 
19 Nosal I, 2009 WL 981336, at *4. Although it was Nosal’s codefendants—and not 
Nosal himself—who actually accessed KFI’s computer system, the indictment alleged that 
Nosal had aided and abetted his codefendants in the commission of the crime. Nosal IV, 
676 F.3d at 856. 
20 Nosal I, 2009 WL 981336, at *4. 
21 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4); Nosal I, 2009 WL 981336, at *4. 
22 See Nosal I, 2009 WL 981336, at *4. 
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spirators, who were initially authorized to access a protected computer 
and subsequently used information acquired from that computer in a 
prohibited manner.23 
 In 2009, in Nosal I, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of California initially denied Nosal’s motion on the ground that an em-
ployee who accesses an employer’s protected computer intending to 
defraud the employer inherently accesses that computer “without au-
thorization.”24 Shortly thereafter in 2009, however, in LVRC Holdings v. 
Brekka, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that satis-
faction of the “without authorization” prong in § 1030(a)(4) turns only 
on whether an individual has received permission to access a protected 
computer, not on an individual’s mental state or specific intent.25  
 In light of the Brekka decision, Nosal moved for reconsideration of 
the district court’s initial denial of his motion to dismiss.26 In 2010, in 
Nosal II, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California 
granted Nosal’s motion and agreed with his contention that the Brekka 
decision precluded the defendants from being held criminally liable 
under the “without authorization” prong of § 1030(a)(4).27 Deprived of 
its theory based on the “without authorization” prong of § 1030(a)(4), 
the government argued that the CFAA counts alternatively could be 
sustained under the “exceeds authorized access” prong.28 Under this 
view, KFI’s computer use policy, which prohibited the dissemination of 
information acquired from KFI’s protected computer to outside par-
ties, defined the scope of the access that KFI authorized its employees 
to have.29 The government argued that Nosal’s codefendants “ex-
ceed[ed] authorized access” by accessing KFI’s protected computer and 
then using information acquired from that computer in a manner pro-
hibited by KFI’s computer use policy.30  
                                                                                                                      
23 See id. 
24 See id. at *7. Here, the court took direction from an earlier decision issued by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which arrived at the same conclusion. See 
Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that an 
employee who seeks to defraud an employer thereby waives any authorization to access 
that employer’s computer). 
25 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). 
26 United States v. Nosal (Nosal II ), No. C 08-0237 MHP, 2010 WL 934257, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 6, 2010). 
27 Id. at *6. 
28 Id. at *7. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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 The district court rejected this argument as well, finding it unsup-
ported by the CFAA’s text.31 Although the CFAA offers no separate def-
inition for “without authorization,” it does offer one for “exceeds au-
thorized access”: specifically, “to access a computer with authorization 
and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer 
that the accessor is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”32 The government 
maintained that a user who is authorized to access a protected comput-
er, but subsequently uses information acquired from that computer in a 
manner prohibited by the computer’s owner, “alter[s]” that infor-
mation in a manner to which the user is “not entitled” and thereby “ex-
ceeds authorized access.”33 The court disagreed, holding that the 
meaning of the word “alter” cannot be reconciled with the act of mis-
appropriation, which, in the court’s view, does not entail the alteration 
of information stored on a protected computer.34 Concluding that 
these CFAA counts could not be sustained under either the “without 
authorization” prong or the “exceeds authorized access” prong, the 
district court granted Nosal’s motion and dismissed these counts.35 
 The government appealed, and in 2011, in Nosal III, a panel of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
dismissal of the CFAA counts.36 Sitting en banc in Nosal IV, the court 
subsequently reversed the panel, affirming the district court’s dismissal 
of the CFAA counts.37 
II. Divergent Interpretations of “Exceeds Authorized Access”  
 Because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2009 de-
cision in United States v. Brekka had conclusively foreclosed the “without 
authorization” prong as a statutory basis for the CFAA charges against 
Nosal, the limited question facing both the Nosal III panel and, on re-
hearing, the Nosal IV en banc court was whether the charges could be 
                                                                                                                      
31 Id. 
32 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2006). 
33 See Nosal II, 2010 WL 934257, at *7. 
34 Id. (“There is simply no way to read [18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6)] to incorporate corpo-
rate policies governing use of information unless the word alter is interpreted to mean 
misappropriate. Such an interpretation would defy the plain meaning of the word alter, as 
well as common sense.”). 
35 Id. at *8. Other CFAA counts were sustained on factual grounds not relevant here. 
See id. 
36 See United States v. Nosal (Nosal III ), 642 F.3d 781, 782 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 
676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012). 
37 See Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 863–64. 
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sustained under the “exceeds authorized access” prong.38 This question 
largely turned on whether “exceeds authorized access” can be read in a 
broad manner that expands the CFAA to encompass misappropria-
tion.39 Two other circuits had already adopted this broad interpretation 
of “exceeds authorized access,” and the Nosal III panel endorsed that 
interpretation.40 Worried that the broad interpretation would criminal-
ize a vast swath of innocuous and widespread conduct, however, the 
Nosal IV en banc court broke ranks with its sister circuits, reversed the 
Nosal III panel’s decision, and adopted the narrow interpretation of 
“exceeds authorized access”—one that excludes misappropriation 
from the CFAA’s ambit.41 
 Section A of this Part examines the decisions rendered by the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and the Ninth 
Circuit panel in Nosal III, all of which adopted the broad interpretation 
of the CFAA.42 Section B discusses the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision 
in Nosal IV, which instead adopted the narrow interpretation.43 
A. The Fifth Circuit, Eleventh Circuit, and Nosal III Panel Adopt a Broad 
Interpretation and Include Misappropriation Within the CFAA’s Ambit 
 Both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits already had considered the 
question of the CFAA’s scope under the “exceeds authorized access” 
prong before the Nosal III panel rendered its decision, and both courts 
had adopted an interpretation of that prong that includes misappro-
priation.44 Guided by these precedents, the Nosal III panel followed 
suit.45 These three decisions recognize a common principle: that the 
term “authorized access” refers not only to the information that a user 
is permitted to access on a computer system, but also to the purposes 
for which a user is authorized to use that information.46 
                                                                                                                      
38 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); United States v. Nosal (Nosal IV ), 
676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); United States v. Nosal (Nosal III ), 642 F.3d 
781, 785, rev’d en banc, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012). 
39 See Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 856; Nosal III, 642 F.3d at 785. 
40 See Nosal III, 642 F.3d at 788 (endorsing the conclusions of its sister circuits); accord 
United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that CFAA encom-
passes misappropriation); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010) (same). 
41 See Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 859, 863. 
42 See infra notes 44–62 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 63–82 and accompanying text. 
44 See Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263; John, 597 F.3d at 272. 
45 See Nosal III, 642 F.3d at 789. 
46 See id.; Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263; John, 597 F.3d at 272. Notably, these decisions, 
which adopted the broad interpretation of “exceeds authorized access” in the criminal 
context, were preceded by a First Circuit decision that adopted the broad interpretation 
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 In 2010, in United States v. John, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit held that a defendant could be charged under the “ex-
ceeds authorized access” prong for using information she accessed 
from her employer’s computer system in furtherance of a crime.47 
There, the defendant, a former bank teller, acquired personal custom-
er information stored on the bank’s protected computer and used it to 
defraud the bank’s customers.48 The defendant argued that she could 
not be found liable under the “exceeds authorized access” prong of 
§ 1030(a)(2) because the bank had authorized her to access its custom-
ers’ personal information as part of her position.49 The court, however, 
rejected this argument.50 Instead, the court held that a user “exceeds 
authorized access” not only by accessing information stored on a pro-
tected computer without permission, but also by using information ac-
quired from a protected computer for a criminal purpose.51 Because 
the defendant used information stored on the bank’s computer in 
commission of a crime, the court held that she could be found liable 
under the “exceeds authorized access” prong even though her employ-
er had authorized her to access that information.52 
 In 2010, in United States v. Rodriguez, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit expanded the Fifth Circuit’s view, holding that a 
defendant may “exceed[] authorized access” by using information 
stored on a computer system for any unauthorized purpose, regardless 
                                                                                                                      
for civil actions brought under the CFAA. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 
F.3d 577, 583 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that employees who accessed and used information 
on a computer system in violation of a confidentiality agreement “exceed[ed] authorized 
access” for purposes of civil liability under the CFAA). 
47 597 F.3d at 271. The defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) of the 
CFAA, unlike the defendant in Nosal, who was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). See 
id. at 270. Unlike § 1030(a)(4), § 1030(a)(2) omits any specific intent requirement. Com-
pare 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (assigning a specific intent require-
ment of “with intent to defraud”), with 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (assigning only a mens rea 
requirement of “intentionally” and omitting any specific intent requirement). Both sec-
tions, however, incorporate the same “exceeds authorized access” prong and therefore 
implicate the same interpretive question facing the court in Nosal. See 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(a)(2), (a)(4). 
48 John, 597 F.3d at 269. 
49 Id. at 271. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 271. Compare id. at 272 (stating that “the concept of ‘exceeds authorized ac-
cess’ may include exceeding the purposes for which access is ‘authorized’”), with LVRC 
Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating in dicta that the “ex-
ceeds authorized access” prong contemplates users who are authorized to access only a 
limited portion of a computer system). 
52 See John, 597 F.3d at 272. 
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of whether that purpose is criminal.53 There, the defendant, a former 
employee of the Social Security Administration, was convicted of access-
ing sensitive personal information stored on his employer’s computer 
in order to spy on multiple women in whom he was romantically inter-
ested.54 As in John, the defendant argued that, because his employer 
had authorized him to access personal information stored on its com-
puter as part of his job duties, he could not be found criminally liable 
under the “exceeds authorized access” prong of § 1030(a)(2).55 The 
court rejected this argument, however, noting that the Social Security 
Administration’s computer use policy prohibited its employees from 
accessing personal information for non-business purposes.56 The court 
held that both the plain text of the CFAA and the terms of the employ-
er’s computer use policy established that the defendant had “ex-
ceed[ed] authorized access” by acquiring personal information for a 
purpose that his employer had not authorized.57 
 Taking direction from its sister circuits, in 2011, in Nosal III, a pan-
el of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also adopted the 
broad interpretation of “exceeds authorized access.”58 In reaching this 
conclusion, the panel addressed the district court’s textual holding in 
Nosal II that the definition of “exceeds authorized access” prescribed by 
§ 1030(e)(6) cannot be reconciled with the broad interpretation.59 The 
panel disagreed with the district court, holding that the word “so” in 
that definition should be read as “in that manner.”60 On this reading, 
the panel held, an individual who receives authorization to access a 
protected computer but uses information acquired from that computer 
in violation of its use policy would not be “entitled” to “obtain” such 
information “in that manner.”61 Therefore, the panel concluded that 
                                                                                                                      
53 See 628 F.3d at 1263. The defendant was convicted under § 1030(a)(2)(B) of the 
CFAA, unlike the Nosal defendants, who were convicted under § 1030(a)(4). Id. at 1262; see 
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B), (a)(4) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Although the two sections pre-
scribe different mens rea and specific intent requirements, both sections incorporate the 
“exceeds authorized access” prong and therefore implicate the same interpretive question 
facing the court in Nosal. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B), (a)(4); Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 856–
57; see also supra note 47 (comparing these provisions). 
54 See Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1260–62. 
55 See id. at 1263; John, 597 F.3d at 271. 
56 Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263. 
57 Id. 
58 See Nosal III, 642 F.3d at 789. 
59 See id. at 785–86. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
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such an individual would “exceed authorized access” and thereby vio-
late the CFAA.62 
B. Sitting En Banc, the Ninth Circuit Adopts a Narrow Interpretation and 
Excludes Misappropriation from the CFAA’s Ambit 
 Sitting en banc in Nosal IV, the Ninth Circuit elected to break ranks 
with its sister circuits, reverse the decision rendered by the Nosal III pan-
el, and instead adopt a narrower construction of the “exceeds author-
ized access” prong that excludes misappropriation from the CFAA’s am-
bit.63 The court offered three principal bases for its decision: first, that 
the CFAA’s statutory language does not independently validate the 
broad interpretation of “exceeds authorized access”;64 second, that ex-
panding the CFAA to encompass misappropriation would strain the 
CFAA beyond its original legislative purpose;65 and third, that the broad 
interpretation would criminalize a vast domain of innocuous conduct.66 
 The court first considered whether the statutory text compels ei-
ther the broad or narrow interpretation of “exceeds authorized ac-
cess.”67 In Nosal III, the panel had concluded that the placement of the 
word “so” within the statutory definition of “exceeds authorized access” 
found in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) validates the broad interpretation.68 In 
Nosal IV, however, the court disagreed, observing that “so” could be 
understood in several alternative ways that did not require adopting the 
broad interpretation.69 Identifying no conclusive interpretation fur-
nished by the statutory text itself, the court turned to two other bases of 
statutory construction: legislative intent and policy implications.70 
 Upon consideration of these two bases, the court held that includ-
ing misappropriation within the CFAA’s ambit under the broad inter-
pretation would strain the statute beyond its original legislative pur-
                                                                                                                      
62 See id. 
63 See Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 863–64. 
64 See id. at 858. 
65 See id. at 857–58. 
66 See id. at 859. 
67 See id. at 856.  
68 Nosal III, 642 F.3d at 785–86; see 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2006). 
69 See Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 858. For instance, the court suggested that “so” could simply 
refer to the mechanical method by which a computer user accesses information stored on 
a system, meaning that a user who is authorized only to view information on a computer 
screen might “exceed[] authorized access” by downloading that information onto a thumb 
drive. See id. 
70 See id. at 857–59. 
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pose.71 In Brekka, the court had observed that Congress originally in-
tended the CFAA to serve as an anti-hacking statute.72 The court reiter-
ated this account of the CFAA’s legislative purpose in Nosal IV, conclud-
ing that the statute’s legislative history confirmed the view that 
Congress enacted the statute to combat computer hacking.73 To place 
misappropriation within the ambit of a statute that Congress originally 
intended to serve a more limited function would, in the court’s view, 
impermissibly strain the statute beyond its articulated purpose.74 
 Beyond its concern over a strained legislative purpose, however, 
the court placed its greatest emphasis on the concern that the broad 
interpretation would criminalize a vast domain of innocuous behav-
ior.75 For instance, the court suggested that employees who innocently 
play video games or instant-message with friends while using their 
workplace computers ordinarily do so in violation of their employers’ 
computer use policies.76 Additionally, because the broad interpretation 
of the CFAA recognizes boundaries on “authorized access” established 
by such policies, a procrastinating employee might become criminally 
liable under that interpretation.77 Moreover, the court noted, the broad 
interpretation might criminalize a range of innocuous behavior even 
more expansive than workplace procrastination.78 Virtually every major 
commercial website requires its users to agree to a largely opaque 
terms-of-use policy as a condition of using that website.79 Under the 
broad interpretation, therefore, a user might “exceed authorized ac-
cess” and thereby incur criminal liability simply by violating the terms 
                                                                                                                      
71 See id. at 858. 
72 See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1130. 
73 See Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 858 (“Congress enacted the CFAA in 1984 primarily to ad-
dress the growing problem of computer hacking, recognizing that, ‘[i]n intentionally tres-
passing into someone else’s computer files, the offender obtains at the very least infor-
mation as to how to break into that computer system.’” (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-432, at 9 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2487 (Conf. Rep.))). 
74 See id. at 859. 
75 See id. at 859 (“Were we to adopt the [broad] interpretation, millions of unsuspect-
ing individuals would find that they are engaging in criminal conduct.”). The Nosal III 
panel anticipated this concern but concluded that it was safely barred by the specific intent 
requirement prescribed by § 1030(a)(4). See Nosal III, 642 F.3d at 788–89. 
76 See Nosal IV, 676 F.3d. at 859. In articulating this concern, the court noted that alt-
hough § 1030(a)(4) prescribes mens rea and specific intent requirements that could very 
well exclude innocuous conduct from criminal liability, other sections of the CFAA that 
also incorporate the “exceeds authorized access” prong do not. See Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 859 
(referencing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) as an example). 
77 See Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 859. 
78 See id. at 860–61. 
79 See id. at 861. 
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of that policy, perhaps by posting misleading information on a dating 
website or misrepresenting one’s age when trying to register for Google 
or Facebook as a minor.80  
 In short, the Ninth Circuit in Nosal IV adopted the narrow inter-
pretation of “exceeds authorized access” in deference to its assessment 
of the CFAA’s legislative purpose and the negative policy implications 
that the broad interpretation might engender.81 In the Ninth Circuit’s 
view, one “exceeds authorized access” only by accessing information 
stored on a protected computer that one is not authorized to access, 
not by misusing information after the fact or by violating a use policy 
established by the computer’s owner.82 
III. The Nosal IV Decision: Right for the Wrong Reasons 
 The en banc court in Nosal IV devoted the better part of its opin-
ion to its concern that adopting the broad interpretation of “exceeds 
authorized access” could subject millions of otherwise innocent Ameri-
cans to criminal prosecution.83 That outcome is implausible, however, 
and in any event remains safely barred by the statutory text of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA.84 Moreover, the CFAA’s legislative history 
itself provided the court with sufficient evidence of the statute’s legisla-
tive intent to adopt the narrow interpretation without having to resort 
to policy analysis.85 If the court insisted on articulating a policy basis for 
                                                                                                                      
80 See id. at 862 (“Under the [broad] interpretation of the CFAA, . . . describing your-
self as ‘tall, dark and handsome,’ when you’re actually short and homely, will earn you a 
handsome orange jumpsuit.”). 
81 See id. at 859–60. 
82 See id. at 863. 
83 See United States v. Nosal (Nosal IV ), 676 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
84 See Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 866 (Silverman, J., dissenting). 
85 See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 570 (1969) (holding that in cases 
“where the language of the statute does not make crystal clear its intended scope[,]” a 
court is “compelled to resort to the legislative history”). The CFAA’s legislative history, 
although somewhat wanting in detail, generally supports the narrow interpretation adopt-
ed by the Ninth Circuit. See Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 858; see also Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & 
Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 495–96 (D. Md. 2005) (con-
cluding that the CFAA’s legislative history evinces a legislative intent to target hacking); S. 
Rep. No. 101-544, at 4–5 (1990) (noting that the 1990 amendments to the CFAA, including 
the addition of a civil cause of action, were proposed “in response to . . . the threat posed 
by new techniques for creating and transmitting malicious programs and codes”); S. Rep. 
NO. 99-432, at 2–3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2480 (describing instances 
of hacking as exemplars of “computer crime”); id. at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 
2485 (noting that excessive access by federal employee authorized to use computer should 
generally not warrant criminal penalties); Kyle Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act: Two Problems and Two Solutions, 2009 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 429, 
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its holding, however, a better basis—which the court overlooked— 
would have been the erosion of existing trade secret law that the broad 
interpretation might cause.86 
 The policy rationale that the court did articulate in Nosal IV—that 
is, its concern over widespread criminalization of innocuous conduct— 
was both implausible and irrelevant to the case at hand.87 Nosal was 
charged under § 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA, which requires that a de-
fendant act knowingly, with the specific intent to defraud, and obtain 
something of value.88 Even under the broad interpretation of “exceeds 
authorized access,” therefore, no prosecution could be brought under 
§ 1030(a)(4) against a defendant simply for updating a fantasy football 
team while at work.89 Although other criminal provisions of the CFAA 
that incorporate the “exceeds authorized access” prong lack these ele-
ments and could therefore theoretically be applied arbitrarily, Nosal IV 
presented the Ninth Circuit with neither the factual nor the legal plat-
form for adjudicating infirmities found outside of § 1030(a)(4).90 
 A better and more relevant policy basis for adopting the narrow 
interpretation is that including misappropriation within the ambit of 
§ 1030(a)(4) could displace existing trade secret law by enabling civil 
trade secret plaintiffs to circumvent its requirements.91 Under tradition-
al trade secret law, a party seeking relief for theft or misappropriation of 
a trade secret must establish that the secret holds economic value, was 
not readily discernible to others, and benefited from reasonable at-
tempts to preserve its secrecy.92 These requirements exist to balance the 
interests of a trade secret owner against the public’s interest in accessing 
the ideas of others.93 The broad interpretation of “exceeds authorized 
access” would undermine this policy balance by expanding the CFAA 
                                                                                                                      
452 (concluding that the legislative history supports exclusion of misappropriation from 
the ambit of the CFAA). 
86 See Brenton, supra note 85, at 442. 
87 See Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 866 (Silverman, J., dissenting). 
88 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 856. 
89 See Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 866 (Silverman, J., dissenting). 
90 See id. (“The role of the courts is neither to issue advisory opinions nor to declare 
rights in hypothetical cases, but to adjudicate live cases or controversies.” (quoting Maldo-
nado v. Morales, 556 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009))). 
91 See Brenton, supra note 85, at 443 (explaining that allowing misappropriation claims 
under the CFAA could allow plaintiffs to bypass requirements imposed by traditional trade 
secret law). 
92 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition: Definition of Trade Secret 
§ 39 (1995); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is It Time to Restrain the 
Plaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1425, 1447 (2009). 
93 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition: Definition of Trade Secret 
§ 39 (1995). 
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into an alternative method of recovery for prospective trade secret 
plaintiffs that omits the requirements for trade secrecy imposed by exist-
ing law.94 Under the broad interpretation of “exceeds authorized ac-
cess,” any misappropriation of information stored on a protected com-
puter, even by an authorized user, would violate § 1030(a)(4).95 
Furthermore, a separate provision of the CFAA creates a private right of 
action under which plaintiffs may recover damages caused by a violation 
of any of its criminal provisions, including § 1030(a)(4).96 Consequently, 
the broad interpretation would allow prospective trade secret plaintiffs 
to seek civil recovery under the CFAA for any misappropriation of any 
information—trade secret or not—that is stored on a protected com-
puter.97 Allowing prospective trade secret plaintiffs to obtain relief with-
out having to satisfy the requirements of trade secret status, however, 
would abrogate the public interest in the free exchange of ideas that 
existing trade secret law recognizes.98 
 Admittedly, enhancing private enforcement of trade secrets by re-
ducing barriers to recovery might seem desirable in view of the vital 
position that all forms of intellectual property, including trade secrets, 
occupy in the modern economy.99 That rationale, however, ignores the 
extensive body of law that already provides for trade secret protection, 
including both state and federal statutes and common law.100 Because 
                                                                                                                      
94 Brenton, supra note 85, at 443; see also Garrett D. Urban, Note, Causing Damage With-
out Authorization: The Limitations of Current Judicial Interpretations of Employee Authorization 
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1369, 1390–91 (2011) (ob-
serving that a broad interpretation of the CFAA would displace existing trade secret law). 
95 See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010). 
96 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (“Any person who suffers damage or 
loss by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the violator 
to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.”). 
97 See Brenton, supra note 85, at 438. 
98 See id. 
99 See Graham M. Liccardi, Comment, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for Lit-
igating Trade Secrets in Federal Court, 8 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 155, 156 (2008) 
(advocating for the broad interpretation to expand federal availability of trade secret pro-
tection); Brenton, supra note 85, at 430. For instance, the Economics and Statistics Admin-
istration and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office estimate that the 75 industries most active 
in intellectual property development and utilization contributed $5.06 trillion to the U.S. 
economy in 2010, or 34.8% of the nation’s gross domestic product that year. See Econ. and 
Statistics Admin. & U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Intellectual Property and 
the U.S. Economy: Industries in Focus, at vi–vii (2012), available at http://www. 
uspto.gov/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf. 
100 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition: Definition of Trade Secret 
§ 39 (1995) (compiling trade secret statutes enacted by forty-two states and summarizing 
common law); see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2006) (providing a federal criminal penalty for 
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trade secrets already enjoy robust protection under existing intellectual 
property law, no need exists to expand trade secret protection by adopt-
ing the broad interpretation of the CFAA.101 
Conclusion 
 Motivated by concerns over the criminalization of innocuous con-
duct, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, adopted a narrow interpreta-
tion of the CFAA in Nosal IV and excluded misappropriation from the 
statute’s ambit. The court reasoned that only the narrow interpretation 
ensured that defendants would not be placed behind bars for harmless 
behavior, such as checking ESPN.com at work. Its decision engendered 
a split with two of its sister circuits, which had previously held that a 
computer user can run afoul of the CFAA by using information ac-
quired from a protected computer in an unauthorized manner. 
 Although the court arrived at the correct decision, its rationale 
partially missed the mark. The court correctly concluded that Congress 
intended the CFAA to proscribe computer hacking rather than misap-
propriation. Its worry over the widespread criminalization that might 
ensue under the broad interpretation, however, was both far-fetched 
and irrelevant to the actual case at hand. Moreover, the court over-
looked a different and significant policy interest weighing in favor of 
the narrow interpretation: that the broad interpretation, which in-
cludes misappropriation, threatens to displace existing trade secret law 
and the policies that it incorporates. 
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trade secret theft); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3426.1–.11 (West 2012) (providing a tort remedy 
under California state law for trade secret theft); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 42 (2012) 
(providing a tort remedy under Massachusetts state law for trade secret theft); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 350-B:1 to :9 (2012) (providing a tort remedy under New Hampshire state law 
for trade secret theft); Integrated Cash Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Transactions, Inc., 920 
F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1990) (restating New York common law elements for a claim of trade 
secret theft). 
101 See Nosal IV, 676 F.3d at 857 n.3; supra note 100 and accompanying text. Indeed—
and, in fairness, as the court observed—the indictment against Nosal also charged him 
with trade secret theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1832, and those charges remained pending when 
the en banc court issued its decision. Id. 
